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I. Introduction 
 
Economics is in considerable disarray. Neoclassical orthodoxy still remains the ‘normal 
science’ standard procedure and provides the foundation for economic education. How-
ever, for some time now many economists have claimed that its scientific research pro-
gramme as a problem-solving tool has been squeezed out and is no longer at the cutting-
edge of research (see e.g. Colander/Holt/Rosser 2004, Holt/Rosser/Colander 2011, Ar-
thur 2013).  
 
After the recent global financial crisis, the time seemed right for a scientific overhaul of 
the whole discipline of economics under the heading of ‘new economic thinking‘, an 
idea  promoted as much by economists unhappy with the state of the discipline as by 
economics students unwilling to learn something apparently irrelevant for the real world 
and by economic and business practitioners and patrons who sponsored research that, in 
the past, few were willing to support financially.  
 
It seems obvious that heterodox economics – the part of the scientific community which 
had been critical of the state of the discipline long before the outbreak of the global fi-
nancial crisis and which long before had demanded a ‘new economic thinking‘ – could 
have been seen as a natural candidate for a scientific research programme or paradigm 
that could assume the spotlight. However, heterodox economics is a blurred description 
of a scientific paradigm comprising quite different thought collectives and is based on 
very shaky analytical grounds (see e.g. Mearman 2012). 
 
In this contribution, we will take a closer look at a scientific research programme which 
has often been cited as the one whose time is about to come: complexity economics (see 
e.g. Buchanan 2004, Colander 2003, Beinhocker 2006, Davis 2008; Roos 2015). Before 
we attempt to describe the paradigmatic foundations of complexity economics and ar-
range them in the context of the orthodox/heterodox divide, we need to explain our un-
derstanding of the concept of a paradigm and clarify what makes a paradigm orthodox 
or heterodox and why it is important to classify a paradigm as either orthodox or heter-
odox. The paper will conclude with a statement about the paradigmatical position of 
complexity economics and its significance for the future of the economic discipline.   
 
II.  Why should we care about the orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide? 
 
When Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was first published in 
1962 (Kuhn 1962), it was met with great interest by many economists who believed 
they had lived through the advent of a paradigmatic shift in economics after the publica-
tion of Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities in 1960 
(Sraffa 1960), the renewed interest in John Maynard Keynes’s writings and the sudden 
discussion about ‘what Keynes really meant’ (see e.g. Clower 1965, Coddington 1974).1 
Although this ‘Keynesian revolution’ never occured, the late 1960s and early 1970s 
saw, at least, the rise of paradigmatic approaches that considered themselves clearly in 
                                                 
1
  According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution can be triggered either by the proof of internal 
theoretical inconsistencies within the mainstream theory or by empirical falsification. Yet, it 
will lose its dominant position only if an alternative is available to replace it. The Sraffian cri-
tique was considered just such a proof of internal theoretical inconsistencies and the (post) 
Keynesian theory as the necessary alternative.  
 2 
opposition to the neoclassical mainstream (see Fine 1997: 148, Lee 2009, Heise/Thieme 
2016). While the label ‘heterodoxy‘ became popular only later, this oppositional per-
spective taken by, among others, Marxian, Sraffian, Post Keynesian and Radical econ-
omists established the dualistic divide between orthodox or mainstream economists on 
one side and heterodox or non-mainstream economists on the other. Despite being criti-
cized for ignoring too many shades in between – e.g. dissenters within the mainstream 
or mainstream heterodoxy, new heterodoxy and traditional heterodoxy (see Lavoie 
2014: 8f., Davis 2008) – or for being too static, this dualistic division is useful in order 
to distinguish between a meaningful pluralism which builds on clear paradigmatic op-
postion and less meaningful variation, multitude or specialisation which can be 
achieved within paradigmatic monism (see Heise 2016a).  
 
The distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy and the classification of paradigms 
as belonging either to the one or the other is not only interesting from a philosophical 
point of view, but it is also important in order to understand the development of a disci-
pline: if in the course of events a heterodox paradigm becomes dominant (and, thus, 
assumes a position that would be called ‘orthodoxy’ or ‘mainstream’ henceforth), this 
would truly mark a paradigmatic revolution - something the history of the economics 
discipline has yet to experience despite assertions to the contrary.
2
 Moreover, if the plu-
ralism campaign finally gains momentum and results, for example, in institutional sup-
port for otherwise neglected or downplayed heterodox paradigms, then in order to pre-
vent free-rider behaviour it must be clear which paradigms can rightly claim to be het-
erodox and which cannot. 
 
III. Scientific Paradigm – weasel word or concept of substance? 
 
The orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide rests on the distinction between different scientific 
paradigms which themsevles are based on inherent incompatibilities and incommen-
surabilities framing the oppositional perspective of the dualism. Taking Kuhn’s (1962: 
10) definition of a scientific paradigm as  "universally recognized scientific achieve-
ments that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practi-
tioners”, one is left without clear orientation or concise delineation. While the openess 
and flexibilty of the concept may, on the one hand, have been crucial for its career in the 
philosophy of science, they make it difficult, on the other hand, to apply in a distinct 
way. Therefore, in order to avoid rendering it a scientific weasel word, we will borrow 
substance from a related concept which, moreover, appears better suited to the social 
sciences: Imre Lakatos’s scientific research programmes (srp).  
 
Using Lakatos’s concept of scientific research programmes as a framework, we can 
identify the dimensions that constitute a scientific paradigm: (1) the methodical dimen-
sion, i.e. a methodology and related research methods that are considered acceptable, or 
‘scientific’ and that direct the research perspective (e.g. static-equilibrium or dynamic-
disequilibrium oriented); (2) the epistemological dimension, which centres around a 
series of core assumptions (axioms) that underlie those models or theories comprising a 
paradigm. This core is surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary assumptions which, 
                                                 
2
 Best known, of course, is the ‘marginalist revolution‘ which marked a radical methodical shift, 
but involved no clear rejection of the ‘classical‘ ontology – more on this in the next part. And 
the ‘Keynesian revolution‘, as another contender, never really was (see e.g. Blaug 1991, 
Laidler 1999, Hutton 2001).    
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if they are varied, are responsible for an epistemological variation within a paradigm. 
And, most importantly, (3) the heuristic (or ontological) dimension must be men-
tioned, which builds on (‘ex ante’ synthetic3) pre-analytic visions, ‘model-solution’ or 
‘ideal types’. They form postulates that correlate with the core assumptions of the epis-
temological dimension and that must be accepted (‘positive heuristics’) or, at least, not 
called into question (‘negative heuristics’) if allegiance to a paradigm is to be main-
tained. The heuristic dimension is critical as it frames a shared belief of the adherents of 
a paradigm about the nature of the subject under investigation. The nature of the subject 
is to be distinguished from the perspective from which the subject will be investigated. 
More concretely: if the economic system is onotologically understood as primarily in-
volving intertemporal exchange relations (‘market economy’), this does not exclude the 
possibility of different perspectives which will be addressed in the epistemological or 
methodical dimensions: The assumption of either strictly rational or ‘bounded rational’ 
choices at an epistemological level is not inconsistent with a common heuristic, nor is 
the focus on either static or dynamic properties of a complex, evolving system at a 
methodological level.  
 
Theories and models that share the same methodical, epistemological and heuristic di-
mensions can, thus, be said to form a common paradigm; theories and models that differ 
in one or more of these dimensions would be regarded as forming different paradigms. 
Yet, however fierce the intellectual competition may be between paradigms that differ 
in the epistemological and methodical dimensions, as long as they share the same (at 
least negative) heuristic, i.e. as long as they are based on the same pre-analytic vision, 
they could be seen as compatible and commensurable. In terms of the previously men-
tioned orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide, all paradigms that are based on the same pre-
analytic vision as the dominant paradigm constituting the ‘normal science’ of a disci-
pline would be part of the wider mainstream, although regarded perhaps as ‘dissenters’ 
from the orthodoxy (see tab. 1).
 4
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher, distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judge-
ments. Analytic judgements are contained within the object in question; they do not bring us 
any new knowledge (e.g. the ‘gray horse’ is white); synthetic judgements, by contrast, provide 
us with new knowledge, since they are not already contained within the object (e.g. ‘the horse 
eats grass’). 
4
 Backhouse (2004) distinguishes between ‘disagreement‘, ‘controversy‘ and ‘dissent‘. Disa-
greement can be seen as normal procedure for scientific advancement, controversy as a tem-
porary phenomenon usually settled (not necessarily resolved) eventually and dissent as lasting 
opposition. This differentiation appears to fit our classification with disagreement and even 
controversy centring around epistemological and methodical questions within the mainstream, 
while dissent would be reserved for heterodox opposition to the mainstream. Yet, Backhouse 
blurs this exact dividing line by maintaining that there are orthodox (accepted by the 
manstream) and heterodox (marginalised by the mainstream) dissenters. Although this impre-
cise notion of ‘dissent’ has become prevalent in the literature, I prefer to use ‘dis-
sent/dissenter’ only for disagreement or controversy within the mainstream.     
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Table 1: Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy 
Heuristic B, C, D Heuristic A 
Non-Mainstream Mainstream 
 
 
Theory 
J 
 
 
Theory 
I 
Theory 
F 
Theory D 
 
Theory A 
Theory 
G 
 
Theory E Theory B 
Theory 
H 
 
Theory C 
Heterodoxy Dissenter Orthodoxy 
 
Sometimes, the broader conjunction of paradigms sharing the same heuristic dimension 
as the dominant one is called ‘orthodoxy’ and the narrower one ‘mainstream’ (see e.g. 
Lavoie 2014: 8f. who, again, refers to Backhouse).  I have opted for the opposite nam-
ing because it better complies with the common usage of ‘orthodoxy’ as the pure doc-
trine to be found, for instance, in textbooks, while ‘mainstream’ commonly indicates a 
broader current. 
  
Let’s put some flesh on the bones by considering a variety of theoretical thought collec-
tives: it appears safe to say that D(ynamic)S(tochastic)G(eneral) E(quilibrium) theoriz-
ing constitutes the economic orthodoxy (see tab. 1). It is an amalgam of New Classical 
Economics and neo-Keynesianism which is based on the same core assumptions of ra-
tionality, ergodicity, and substitutionality exhibiting the hallmarks of social exchange 
theory (see e.g. Davidson 1984, Davidson 2007) at the epistemological level. In addi-
tion, the DSGE relies exclusively on formal-mathematical, positivist deductive reduc-
tionism (see Lawson 2006) at the methodical level. Over the course of the so-called 
‘empirical turn’ during the past three decades, this constellation of elements has been 
combined with sophisticated systems of micro- and macroeconometrics, as well as ex-
perimental designs that harness approaches used in the natural sciences, such as physics 
and chemistry (see Schmidt/aus dem Moore 2010). The postulates of (long-term) stabil-
ity, optimality and neutrality (Walras's Law, monetary neutrality, policy inefficiency), 
which are operational a priori in the core assumptions of DSGE theory, guide the ‘ideal 
solution’ (Musterlösungen) at the ontological level, thus functioning as a metric for 
negative heuristics, i.e. the research approaches not to be called into question. Ontologi-
cally, DSGE models can be said to occupy an allocational perspective (‘constrained 
optimisation’). The ostensibly large differences in forecasts delivered by the hyperstable 
equilibrium models of New Classical Economics compared with the dis-equilibrium 
models of standard Keynesianism and neo-Keynesianism (i.e. Theories A, B and C in 
tab.1) are attributable to modified assumptions within the ‘protective belt’ (e.g. concern-
ing adjustment speeds, price and quantity rigidities, expectation formation, etc.), yet 
these differences are not(!) evidence of divergent paradigmatic origins
5
.   
 
                                                 
5
 Accordingly, both approaches are found in modern textbooks, where a distinction is 
made between short-term forecasts (the neo-Keynesian model) and long-term forecasts 
(the neoclassical model). For more, see Abel/Bernanke (2005); and Blanchard (2006). 
 5 
Behavioural economics, assuming that this rather new approach is given the status of a 
paradigm of its own, discloses little about its ontological basis. The fact that prominent 
protagonists for this paradigm hasten to claim alliance with and allegiance to the DSGE 
orthodoxy
6
 suggests that they share (positive heuristic) or, at least, do not oppose (nega-
tive heuristic) the real exchange ontology of the DSGE paradigm. If one still maintains 
a paradigmatic distinction from the orthodoxy, differences must be found either at the 
methodical or epistemological levels. Indeed, the experimental character of behavioural 
economics and the rejection of the rationality axiom (as an outcome of the experiments 
as much as a behavioural assumption) can be seen as methodically and epistemological-
ly different enough to grant it a paradigmatic status on its own – however, not one that 
is in opposition to the orthodoxy but rather a dissenter as in tab. 1.  
 
Post Keynesianism, as a third example, comprises different Kaleckian, Sraffian and 
Fundamentalist approaches (i.e. Theories F,G and H in tab. 1). These all, by and large, 
share the methodical dimension with the orthodoxy, yet reject the rationality, substitu-
tionality and ergodicity axioms at the epistemological level and, crucially, draw on a 
different pre-analytic vision: the economic system is not primarily understood as a net-
work of (real and symmetric) exchange relations but as a system based on (asymmetric 
and nominal) obligations or power relations (see Heise 2016b). Ontologically, Post 
Keynesianism claims a social provisioning perspective
7
. Therefore, it surely forms not 
only a distinct paradigm, but also one that clearly opposes the orthodoxy and must, thus, 
be rated as heterodox (see tab. 1).
8
 
       
IV. Complexity economics – its paradigmatical substance 
 
Although economics is often lamented to be a colonizing, imperial discipline particular-
ily with respect to the other social sciences, it has also throughout its existence always 
borrowed from other disciplines: from history, physics, biology and informatics. Basing 
its methods, methodology and epistemology solidly on other sciences was usually 
meant to import authority and professionality. What was acceptable in the highly reput-
ed sciences seemed good enough for economics. While the neoclassical mainstream 
emulates the concepts of hydraulic physics
9
, complexity economics is part of an inter-
disciplinary project of complexity sciences covering physics, biology, chemistry and 
informatics
10
; some already talk of this as a revolution in science from the predominant 
                                                 
6
 See e.g. Smith (2003: 505), Cartwright (2011: 4). 
7
 “…the theory of output and employment as a whole…” as Keynes (1936: 293) had put it in his 
General Theory. For more on the heterodox concept of social provisioning see e.g. Jo (2011). 
8
 Sometimes the vehemence by which leading Post Keynesians try to set themselves apart from 
standard or neo-Keynesians (see e.g. Davidson 1992, Lavoie 2014) appears abstruse and diffi-
cult to convey – our claim that they are not only part of different paradigms but on opposing 
sides of the orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide might help understanding this behaviour.  
9
 This is probably best illustrated by the ‘Monetary National Income Analogue Computer’ 
(MONIAC) constructed by Alban W. Phillips and displayed e.g. at the University of Cam-
bridge.  
10
 A major cornerstone in the development of complexity science was the foundation of the 
Santa Fe Institute (SFI) in 1984 which brought together a number of leading scientists from 
the natural sciences as well as the social sciences and humanities. The research agenda was 
about ‘complex adaptive systems’ in which systems could be economic, biological, physical, 
chemical or social. 
 6 
reductionist approach of the past to emergentism as the future of science (see Fromm 
2004: 4ff.). 
 
‘Complexity’ and ‘complex systems’ are ill-defined terms; Perona (2007), accordingly, 
speaks of ‘the confused state of complexity economics’. Despite the fact that some in-
gredients seem to be uncontroversial, the ontological and epistemological character of 
complexity economics is anything but clear and uniform. Let’s start with the less con-
troversial ingredients (see e.g. Durlauf 2012; Arthur 2013; Roos 2015): 
 
* a large number of heterogenous interacting agents 
* self-organisation, self-adaptability 
* non-linear dynamics 
* non-equilibrium 
 
These ingredients form system properties, which again, appear uncontroversial: 
emergence and (theoretical) unpredictability
11. By ‘emergence’ is meant a system prop-
erty which combines determinacy (due to the assumed existence of interconnections 
between all system elements) with downward causation (i.e. the assumption that macro-
level outcomes cannot be deduced entirely from micro-level properties) and, therefore, 
gives rise to unpredictability (see e.g. Christen/Franklin 2002). However, two distinct 
approaches can be broadly identified in the literature which differ in focus and accen-
tuation (see e.g. Bronk 2011): 1) ‘Epistemological complexity’ concentrates on the 
non-linear interconnections of heterogenous interacting agents resulting in emergent 
macro-outcomes at the epistemological level. As the system is assumed to be closed and 
(macro-)determinate at the ontological level, complexity translates in ‘complicated-
ness’: “It is a vision that sees the economy as so complicated that simple analytical 
models of the aggregate economy – models that can be specified in a set of analytically 
solvable equations – are not likely to be helpful in understanding many of the issues that 
economists want to address” (Holt/Rosser/Colander 2011: 358). In contrast to neoclas-
sical orthodoxy, this school of complexity economics rejects reductionist constraint op-
timisation at the methodical level as too simplistic and replaces it with an emergentism 
that relies on algorithmic computation rather than linear optimisation. As science is 
based on a reduction of the complexities of reality, epistemological complexity econo-
mists praise neoclassical economics for their historical merits in the formation of the 
discipline (see Foster 2005: 881) but claim that deductive reductionism has eliminated 
too many essential features of economic reality to still be of use: Ockham’s razor has 
simply been too sharp. Although, as far as I am aware, this has never been stated explic-
itly, there seems no reason why complexity economics of this kind would – at the mac-
roeconomic level – reject Walras’ law since it shares the same pre-analytic vision with 
the orthodoxy as a heuristic device. 2) ‘Ontological complexity’ blows up the monistic 
vision of economic reality as a closed system in favour of an open system ontology 
which enhances emergence towards contingency
12
. Contingency relates to a representa-
tion of reality which is non-deterministic and non-ergodic in the sense that the future 
occurrence of a variable cannot be traced by its past developments and, thus, cannot be 
fully analysed and rationally expected using probability calculus because it is funda-
                                                 
11
 Theoretical, as opposed to inductive unpredictability (for the difference see Christen/Franklin 
2002), simply means that from the bare axiomatic (micro) structure of a theory, no unique 
macro outcome can be predicted. 
12
 The concept of contingency originated in Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory; see e.g. Provost 
(1986). 
 7 
mentally uncertain. Fundamental uncertainty is not to be confused with non-
predictability: As Davidson (1993; 1996) has shown, fundamental uncertainty does not 
need to rely on non-linear dynamics (as non-predictability), while Rosser (2006: 89) 
argues that non-predictability, unlike fundamental uncertainty, also occurs in ergodic 
environments – leaving it open which of the two conceptions is the more general one. 
Epistemologically and methodically, both complexity conceptions follow similar routes: 
algorithmic, non-equilibrium modelling based on bounded rational, heterogenous and 
socially interacting agents engaged in intertemporal exchanges in network structures
13
. 
Again, it has never been made explicit how complexity economics of the ontological 
kind positions itself with respect to the validity of Walras’ law. Yet, in open, non-
ergodic systems Walras’ law does not necessarily hold if the pre-analytic vision is dif-
ferent from a real-exchange economy (see Heise 2016b and Keynes 1933a; Keynes 
1933b). In this domain, the ontological kind of complexity economics remains unclear 
and inaccessible.      
 
By way of summary, it should be pointed out that complexity economics forms two 
different paradigms that show a close ‘family resemblance’ (Arthur et al. 1997: 2) with 
respect to the epistemological and methodical dimensions of their respective scientific 
research programmes, yet do not share the same ontological basis. The two paradigms 
called complexity economics I and complexity economics II, for want of better names at 
this point
14
, may have more in common (non-equilibirum orientation, algorithmic for-
malisation, bounded rational operation) than separating them (closed versus open, 
emergent versus contingent, deterministic-ergodic versus non-deterministic-non-
ergodic), yet the distinction should not be overlooked and may be important with re-
spect to the orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide.              
 
V. Complexity economics: on which side of the orthodoxy/heterodoxy 
divide? 
 
The majority of complexity economists group around the epistemological notion as 
used, for example, by the renowned and influential Santa Fe Institute (SFI; see Peroni 
(2007: 41ff.). Authors such as Steven Durlauf, Lawrence Blume and Brian Arthur are 
confident about the new opportunities that complexity economics brings to the econom-
ics discipline in addition to orthodox neoclassical economics. Nevertheless, they clearly 
do not see their paradigm in opposition to and, therefore, as a challenge to neoclassical 
economics but rather as a modernized, probably more general version of it or, perhaps 
more appropriately, an addition to it. As Steven Durlauf (2012: 45f.), longtime project 
leader at SFI, puts it: “. . . I argue that complexity thinking can enrich the way in which 
economists conceptualize various phenomena, but that this enrichment is complemen-
tary to current economic methodology. The claim is justified by considering a range of 
definitions of compelxity in order to highlight the features of complex systems that dif-
fer from conventional economic reasoning. In doing this, I reject suggestions that com-
                                                 
13
 Foster (2005: 884) highlights the importance of the network structure of the connections for 
complexity economics as distinct from the neoclassical orthodoxy which focuses on actors. 
Taking into account his belief that networks must always be seen as open systems, the com-
plexity economics he has in mind refers to ‘ontological complexity’.  
14
 Rosser (2006: 76) also distinguishes two approaches to complexity science: broad tent and 
small tent complexity. However, as his distinction does not entirely conform with my distinc-
tion, I refrain from using these labels.   
 8 
plexity represents a new paradigm for the social sciences”. And Brian Arthur (2013: 
17ff.; italics in the original), one of the founding fathers of the economics programme at 
SFI, focuses on the different, yet compatible perspectives of neoclassical and complexi-
ty economics (of the epistemological kind): “There are two great problems in econom-
ics. One is allocation within the economy: how quantities of goods and services and 
their prices are determined within and across markets. This is represented by the great 
theories of general equilibrium, international trade, and game-theoretic analysis. The 
other is formation within the economy: how an economy emerges in the first place, and 
grows and changes structurally over time. This is represented by ideas about innovation, 
economic development, stuctural change, and the role of history, institutions, and gov-
ernance in the economy . . . It is now clear to economists that the mathematical analysis 
of allocation far from covers all of economics and operates poorly with questions of 
formation, exploration, adaptation, and qualitative change . . . Complexity economics by 
contrast is very much about these questions of creation and formation of structure, and it 
studies the mechanisms by which these operate.” And he adds: “Complexity economics 
is not a special case of neoclassical economics. On the contrary, equilibrium economics 
is a special case of nonequilibrium and hence complexity economics” (Arthur 2013: 
19). A third problem, that of social provisioning, which is addressed particularly by Post 
Keynesian and Marxian economists and gives rise to an alternative pre-analystic vision, 
is neglected.  
 
This appraisal goes along very well with the paradigmatical categorisation given above 
(see tab. 2): Complexity economics I – which we will dub ‘mainstream complexity eco-
nomics’ (MCE) henceforth – is based on different epistemological and methodical 
foundations than neoclassical (DSGE) economics but shares by and large the same on-
tology. And even here, as with the differences in the epistemological and methodical 
dimensions, the distinction is one of perspective, not of substance. It, therefore, appears 
appropriate to categorise MCE as part of the mainstream, albeit as a dissenting part. 
This assessment is reinforced by the fact that proponents of MCE (are allowed to) pub-
lish in the most highly reputed economics journals (such as American Economic Re-
view, Journal of Political Economy, European Economic Review, Economic Journal) 
which are usually not open to heterodox contributions. 
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Table 2: Classification of paradigms 
Paradigm Epistemological 
dimension (Axioms) 
Methodical di-
mension 
Ontological 
dimension 
(heuristics/ 
postulates) 
 
Status 
Neoclassical 
economics 
(DSGE) 
 Rationality 
  Ergodicity 
 Substitutionality 
 Reductionism 
  Linear                                       
optimization 
  Static-equilibrium 
  Empiricism 
 Symmetric ex-
change 
  Closed system 
  Allocational 
perspective 
  Acceptance of 
Walras’ law 
Orthodox 
Complexity 
economics I 
(mainstream 
complexity 
economics 
MCE) 
  Bounded rationality 
  Substitutionality 
  Ergodicity 
  Heterogeneity 
  Non-Linearity 
  Emergentism 
  Non-linear algorith-
mic computation 
  Non-equilibrium 
  Simulation 
  Symmetric 
exchange 
  Closed system 
  Formational 
perspective 
  Acceptance of 
Walras’ law 
Dissenter 
within the 
main-stream 
Complexity 
economics II 
(heterodox 
complexity 
economics 
HCE) 
  Bounded rationality 
  Substitutionality 
  Non-Ergodicity 
  Heterogeneity 
  Non-Linearity 
 
  Contingentism 
  Non-linear algorith-
mic computation 
  Non-equilibrium 
  Simulation 
  Symmetric 
exchange 
  Open system 
  Formational 
perspective 
Heterodox 
Post 
Keynesia-
nism 
  Bounded rationality 
  Non-substitutionality 
 Non-ergodicity 
  Reductionism 
  Linear modelling 
  Narrative reasoning 
  Empiricism 
  Asymmetric 
obligations 
  Open System 
  Social provision-
ing perspective 
  Rejection of 
Walras’ law 
Heterodox 
 
Complexity economics of the ontological camp shares neither the epistemological and 
methodical dimensions nor the ontological dimension with neoclassical economics. 
Whether this distinction is of substance depends primarily on the judgement whether or 
not the open systems claim is based on a different pre-analytic vision (including the 
rejection of Walras’ law). As noted earlier, in this respect complexity economists of this 
camp remain vague and unclear
15
. However, major proponents of the ontological camp, 
such as Barkley Rosser Jr., Herbert Gintis and Alan Kirman, openly display their es-
teem for heterodox economics by engaging in academic exchanges with them, and argu-
ing about the compatibility of complexity economics with heterodox schools of thought 
such as Post Keynesian Economics (see e.g. Rosser 1998, Rosser 2006)
16
. Therefore, it 
seems appropriate to rate the ontological camp of complexity economics as heterodox 
and dub them heterodox complexity economics (HCE; see tab. 2). This assessment is 
                                                 
15
 Kirman (2016: 544ff.) argues that Walras did not establish a coherent mechanism that would 
bring an out-of-equilibrium economy back to a general-equilibrium-state. Yet, it remains un-
clear whether this involves the rejection of Walras‘ law or, merely, that Walras‘ law may be 
compatible with lasting partial disequilibria. 
16
 Herbert Gintis even started off his academic career as heterodox (radical) economist (see 
Katzner  2011: 12ff.).  
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supported by the fact that HCE proponents (are only allowed to) publish – except for 
particular journals specializing in features of economic formation - mainly in heterodox 
journals such as the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, the Review of Political 
Economy or the Cambridge Journal of Economics.     
 
VI. MCE, HCE and the future of economics 
 
David Colander and Roland Kupers (2014) use the picture of the one or two mountains 
to tackle the question about the novelty of complexity economics: either complexity 
economists climb the same mountain as orthodox neoclassical economists but take a 
different route or, alternatively, they abandon the mountain the neoclassical economists 
try to climb and turn instead towards another mountain which appears more appropriate. 
This picture fits our analysis well: the proponents of MCE climb the neoclassical moun-
tain (yet use a different methodical route), while the HCE proponents turn towards an-
other mountain. So, as with the Keynesians, there is a mainstream and a heterodox camp 
of complexity economists.  
 
How does this assessment impact on the future of the economic discipline? Primarily, 
one may argue that complexity economics stands a good chance of having a considera-
ble effect: 1) Cries for a ‘new economic thinking’ are today louder than ever – last, but 
not least, the recent global financial crisis can be understood as the empirical anomaly 
which pushed neoclassical economics into a state of crisis, and complexity economics 
can be seen as a potential alternative (see e.g. Colander et al 2009; Kirman 2010); 2) 
complexity economics is a ‘sister science’ to complexity theories in other disciplines 
including the natural sciences (and some Nobel laureats) – this lends considerable ‘natu-
ral authority’ to this approach; 3) during the advancement of a scientific discipline, the 
degree of complexity (in common parlance) becomes higher – complexity science 
seems to be the next step in this direction in the domain of economics (but not only eco-
nomics); 4) complexity economics is a highly formalized approach satisfying demands 
for accuracy and professionality. Moreover, since the bigger and more influential camp 
– MCE – does not claim to oppose neoclassical economics17, resistance from the ranks 
of the orthodoxy with respect to access to economic, social and cultural capital in the 
field – i.e. professorships, grants, journal space, respected positions outside academia 
etc. – will be low.  
 
But what does this imply for HCE and heterodox economics in general? On the one 
hand, it appears most likely that HCE will not succeed in truly kicking off a paradigmat-
ic revolution in economics.  At best, it will not be strictly separated from MCE and, 
therefore, may also secure access to the aforementioned kinds of capital. ‘Family re-
semblance’ may be as helpful in this respect as the professional cooperation of propo-
nents of both complexity economics camps
18
. On the other hand, from the perspective 
of heterodox economics, not much can be hoped for: even if complexity economics 
were to rise to the state of a ‘normal science’ in economics, this would only pluralise the 
                                                 
17
 Fontana (2008) rates the methodical impact of complexity economics as revolutionary – yet, 
this does not make for a paradigmatic revolution (‘climbing no other mountain’) as long as 
there is no ontological opposition to orthodox neoclassical economics.  
18
 Proponents of MCE and HCE, for example, often co-author articles or co-edit books. In this 
respect, both complexity economics camps alongside the orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide are 
much more friendly than the two Keynesian camps on that divide (neo-Keynesianism and Post 
Keynesianism), which either ignore or outrightly combat each other.   
 11 
paradigmatic pathways with respect to the ontological dimension, once the formation 
perspective of complexity economics and the allocation perspective of neoclassical eco-
nomics is broadened by a social provisioning perspective of heterodox economics. After 
all, there are some indications (see e.g. Colander/Holt/Rosser 2010; Roos 2015) that 
HCE (and, to a lesser extent even MCE) is tolerant and open-minded in this repect.           
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